Pedagogy and Constructivism

John Dewey's 'pedagogical creed' -http://dewey.pragmatism.org/creed.htm

Constructivism in education (Steffe & Gale) pg. 484-485 cover pedagogical implications of radical constructivism - http://books.google.com/books?id=Aq47hdWHtZEC&pg=PA484&lpg=PA484&dq=pedagogical+implications+radical+constructivism&source=bl&ots=DLmCNysfuR&sig=vLDnuMq9I6pHShgd5KOpTex7CQ0&hl=en&ei=3tngS4KSMYng8QTF-oCYCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CCsQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=pedagogical%20implications%20radical%20constructivism&f=false

Over-analyzing RC

I noted in class that I think we may be over-analyzing the Radical Constructivist positon by entertaining ontological notions about tangible, sensible objects such as apples, skies, spears, etc. in an attempt to understand RC. I suggested that we entertain such situations as pedagogical scenarios in an attempt to find some practical use and understanding of RC philosophy. For example, if Professor Johnson has a lesson plan for the class, it is of no concern whether he actually has one or what it is, to the RC, but that each subjective agent experiencing the lesson constructs knowledge claims throughout and about the lesson in a way that is viable for that subjective agent.

Also, whether an experience is direct, or indirect, such as in the situation of experiencing memory, what does it matter, as long as the experience or construct/claim is viable with one's experience?

Are some indirect experiences more viable than others? (assuming there are different kinds of indirect experience, remembering, meditating, etc.)

RC cont.

Even if RC's wish to leave ontological notions out of the picture, or continue with agnostic responses, it seems as though the practical application of thier epistemological position will not be entertained seriously by realists unless RC's concede an objectice reality through which our experiences unfold and to which our constructs are made. If this could be done (and seems to be done with conceding an inter-subjective reality), the notion that each experiencer constructs claims (at least to one's own mind) about that which is experienced, and only that construct can be known may be worth considering in certain scenarios. There seems to be many scenarios, however, in which one's idea of an experience is extremely compatible with another's idea of the experience, and it is interesting how nicely that works out if we all construct ideas for our knowledge of our experience to 'fit' our experience. This conception of knowledge 'fitting' our world would seem to imply that we all have similar ideas that will 'fit' our world, or desire the same world, if our ideas are compatible. Perhaps, on the surface they are compatible, and they must be for subjects in an inter-subjective reality to interact, but in reality, maybe even the compatible ideas are different from subject to subject, and below the surface are mere constructs of how each perceives each one's experience.

What does it mean to claim that knowledge 'fits' the world?

Inter-subjectivity in Radical Constructivism

In order to combat claims of solipsism, von Glasersfeld must admit an inter-subjective reality. In the video he says, "the inherent difficulty (to adopting RC)... in order to interact with other people, you have to concede an inter-subjective reality, which is not a reality in which things exist in their own right, but a reality in which your ideas become more or less compatible with the ideas of the other person." I understand the position of RC appears useful solely for epistemological purposes, as in what we can and cannot know, and attempts to put aside the possibility of the ontological objective "real" world, in favor of the experiential world, however, conceding an inter-subjective reality seems to admit of an objective reality; the moment one concedes of an experiencing agent other than oneself, how can the experiences be known to be compatible without an objective reality? Solely from experience, can one know that the "other person" does not "exist in their own right"? Perhaps, von G would say that one cannot know one way or the other, but it would indeed be radical to claim that in an inter-subjective reality, the other person may not exist in its own right, when experience of this reality tends to strongly suggest the opposite. If inter-subjectivity is conceded, I can see the practicality of RC, in that, "all communication and all understanding are a matter of interpretive constructions on the part of the experiencing subject". As the constructions vary from subjective agents, and the object of our constructing becomes merely a concept as we experience it, and we cannot know it "in its own right", or even if such a thing "in its own right" exists, what is considered knowledge may need to be reevaluated. However, whether these concepts cohere with reality, or become reality, or not, they seem to work, as, "...ideas become more or less compatible with the ideas of the other person."

Does the conceding of an inter-subjective reality point towards conceding of an objective reality?

Time

With regards to time, the video claimed that time is either the unfolding of events or a substratum through which thing happen (?) (I could be wrong with this). It appears to me that time is the substratum through which things unfold, and not the unfolding itself; events need to unfold, and need to do so in a substratum or else everything would happen at once, or always be. However, the rate at which things unfold is relative to the one experiencing the event, in which case the substratum, though immutable itself, allows for variation in the rate of unfolding events. Conciousness may be a determining factor in the rate at which events unfold, as consciousness 'altered' from the state humans are typically in during waking life, brought about from sleep, drugs, meditation, etc. seems to experience time a bit differently, as more events can unfold in a shorter period of time (just as more events can unfold for one traveling at the speed of light).

Is the 'flow' of time, then, merely subjective?

Envy

As a few other students noted, I think envy is rooted in the lack of something within the one who succumbs to envy, and this something is not necessarily what one desires (i.e. the ‘good’). This lack is the primary emotion, and though one may express their state as being envious of another, the emphasis is not so much on the emotion one extends towards the ‘rival’, but the lack of something within, which can continuously manifest. Envy may spring up again, either when the ‘good’ is attained, or even without an effort to attain the ‘good’, as the ‘good’ can come up again and again in different ‘rivals’. Once one realizes it is not really the ‘rival’, or the ‘good’ that is the cause of envy, but the lack of something, whether it be self-esteem, self-confidence or whatever, that one may not desire the ‘good’ any longer, or wish for the ‘rival’ to lose the ‘good’, but still suffer at the recognition of the rival’s good which reminds one, even sub-consciously of something that one lacks.

Envy is a sin because it establishes one’s recognition of something that one lacks, and instead of making an effort to fill that gap, one’s attention is on another’s ‘good’ which one may desire (which can periodically fill the gap) and loathe that other for having, which can promote the thought of ill-will toward another, and/or the prolonging of suffering within oneself.

If the above is true, can envy be a warranted motivator?

Animal Ethics

I am not sure any moral consideration of non-human animals in relation to humans (because this is the real issue; if humans were to not use animals for any purpose, than I think it could be agreed upon that animals should be given consideration solely on the knowledge of their existence, as our species and the environment around us, including other species, does not sustain and thrive on cruelty and destruction) can be considered prior to any specific situation. As other species have become a means to human ends, and this occurs because there is no doubt that a separation exists between human species and others we have encountered (call it speciesism or whatever, that is irrelevant), when is this, if it is, permissible? And this can be evaluated on a case to case scenario; I am not sure one can correctly (or convincingly) argue flat out that it is permissible to kill or not to kill other species. I am curious as to the implications of this, and other ethical issues, as there is no black and white with some of these issues, save perhaps on a case to case basis. For instance, in the case with self-conscious non-human species, one may hold that if there are alternative, accessible and affordable, options to eating self-conscious animals (say pigs), one should take the alternative, as a self-conscious animal can take a conscious interest in its life, something humans can relate to and value perhaps more than anything. However, if there is no alternative, and the human needs to eat, is it ethically permissible to kill the self-conscious animal for food, as painless as possible?

Also, is it not these human specific traits that come up in conversation, such as moral agency, a high level of rationality, and the very ability to entertain these traits in conversation, that allow us to single out our species in relation to any other? Does this warrent some partiality? Thoughts of superiority? How is superiority determined? And can say the superiority of the cheetah with its ability to run faster than humans be outweighed by the humans superiority to be or have any of the traits noted above?