Pedagogy and Constructivism

John Dewey's 'pedagogical creed' -http://dewey.pragmatism.org/creed.htm

Constructivism in education (Steffe & Gale) pg. 484-485 cover pedagogical implications of radical constructivism - http://books.google.com/books?id=Aq47hdWHtZEC&pg=PA484&lpg=PA484&dq=pedagogical+implications+radical+constructivism&source=bl&ots=DLmCNysfuR&sig=vLDnuMq9I6pHShgd5KOpTex7CQ0&hl=en&ei=3tngS4KSMYng8QTF-oCYCQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CCsQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=pedagogical%20implications%20radical%20constructivism&f=false

Over-analyzing RC

I noted in class that I think we may be over-analyzing the Radical Constructivist positon by entertaining ontological notions about tangible, sensible objects such as apples, skies, spears, etc. in an attempt to understand RC. I suggested that we entertain such situations as pedagogical scenarios in an attempt to find some practical use and understanding of RC philosophy. For example, if Professor Johnson has a lesson plan for the class, it is of no concern whether he actually has one or what it is, to the RC, but that each subjective agent experiencing the lesson constructs knowledge claims throughout and about the lesson in a way that is viable for that subjective agent.

Also, whether an experience is direct, or indirect, such as in the situation of experiencing memory, what does it matter, as long as the experience or construct/claim is viable with one's experience?

Are some indirect experiences more viable than others? (assuming there are different kinds of indirect experience, remembering, meditating, etc.)

RC cont.

Even if RC's wish to leave ontological notions out of the picture, or continue with agnostic responses, it seems as though the practical application of thier epistemological position will not be entertained seriously by realists unless RC's concede an objectice reality through which our experiences unfold and to which our constructs are made. If this could be done (and seems to be done with conceding an inter-subjective reality), the notion that each experiencer constructs claims (at least to one's own mind) about that which is experienced, and only that construct can be known may be worth considering in certain scenarios. There seems to be many scenarios, however, in which one's idea of an experience is extremely compatible with another's idea of the experience, and it is interesting how nicely that works out if we all construct ideas for our knowledge of our experience to 'fit' our experience. This conception of knowledge 'fitting' our world would seem to imply that we all have similar ideas that will 'fit' our world, or desire the same world, if our ideas are compatible. Perhaps, on the surface they are compatible, and they must be for subjects in an inter-subjective reality to interact, but in reality, maybe even the compatible ideas are different from subject to subject, and below the surface are mere constructs of how each perceives each one's experience.

What does it mean to claim that knowledge 'fits' the world?

Inter-subjectivity in Radical Constructivism

In order to combat claims of solipsism, von Glasersfeld must admit an inter-subjective reality. In the video he says, "the inherent difficulty (to adopting RC)... in order to interact with other people, you have to concede an inter-subjective reality, which is not a reality in which things exist in their own right, but a reality in which your ideas become more or less compatible with the ideas of the other person." I understand the position of RC appears useful solely for epistemological purposes, as in what we can and cannot know, and attempts to put aside the possibility of the ontological objective "real" world, in favor of the experiential world, however, conceding an inter-subjective reality seems to admit of an objective reality; the moment one concedes of an experiencing agent other than oneself, how can the experiences be known to be compatible without an objective reality? Solely from experience, can one know that the "other person" does not "exist in their own right"? Perhaps, von G would say that one cannot know one way or the other, but it would indeed be radical to claim that in an inter-subjective reality, the other person may not exist in its own right, when experience of this reality tends to strongly suggest the opposite. If inter-subjectivity is conceded, I can see the practicality of RC, in that, "all communication and all understanding are a matter of interpretive constructions on the part of the experiencing subject". As the constructions vary from subjective agents, and the object of our constructing becomes merely a concept as we experience it, and we cannot know it "in its own right", or even if such a thing "in its own right" exists, what is considered knowledge may need to be reevaluated. However, whether these concepts cohere with reality, or become reality, or not, they seem to work, as, "...ideas become more or less compatible with the ideas of the other person."

Does the conceding of an inter-subjective reality point towards conceding of an objective reality?

Time

With regards to time, the video claimed that time is either the unfolding of events or a substratum through which thing happen (?) (I could be wrong with this). It appears to me that time is the substratum through which things unfold, and not the unfolding itself; events need to unfold, and need to do so in a substratum or else everything would happen at once, or always be. However, the rate at which things unfold is relative to the one experiencing the event, in which case the substratum, though immutable itself, allows for variation in the rate of unfolding events. Conciousness may be a determining factor in the rate at which events unfold, as consciousness 'altered' from the state humans are typically in during waking life, brought about from sleep, drugs, meditation, etc. seems to experience time a bit differently, as more events can unfold in a shorter period of time (just as more events can unfold for one traveling at the speed of light).

Is the 'flow' of time, then, merely subjective?

Envy

As a few other students noted, I think envy is rooted in the lack of something within the one who succumbs to envy, and this something is not necessarily what one desires (i.e. the ‘good’). This lack is the primary emotion, and though one may express their state as being envious of another, the emphasis is not so much on the emotion one extends towards the ‘rival’, but the lack of something within, which can continuously manifest. Envy may spring up again, either when the ‘good’ is attained, or even without an effort to attain the ‘good’, as the ‘good’ can come up again and again in different ‘rivals’. Once one realizes it is not really the ‘rival’, or the ‘good’ that is the cause of envy, but the lack of something, whether it be self-esteem, self-confidence or whatever, that one may not desire the ‘good’ any longer, or wish for the ‘rival’ to lose the ‘good’, but still suffer at the recognition of the rival’s good which reminds one, even sub-consciously of something that one lacks.

Envy is a sin because it establishes one’s recognition of something that one lacks, and instead of making an effort to fill that gap, one’s attention is on another’s ‘good’ which one may desire (which can periodically fill the gap) and loathe that other for having, which can promote the thought of ill-will toward another, and/or the prolonging of suffering within oneself.

If the above is true, can envy be a warranted motivator?

Animal Ethics

I am not sure any moral consideration of non-human animals in relation to humans (because this is the real issue; if humans were to not use animals for any purpose, than I think it could be agreed upon that animals should be given consideration solely on the knowledge of their existence, as our species and the environment around us, including other species, does not sustain and thrive on cruelty and destruction) can be considered prior to any specific situation. As other species have become a means to human ends, and this occurs because there is no doubt that a separation exists between human species and others we have encountered (call it speciesism or whatever, that is irrelevant), when is this, if it is, permissible? And this can be evaluated on a case to case scenario; I am not sure one can correctly (or convincingly) argue flat out that it is permissible to kill or not to kill other species. I am curious as to the implications of this, and other ethical issues, as there is no black and white with some of these issues, save perhaps on a case to case basis. For instance, in the case with self-conscious non-human species, one may hold that if there are alternative, accessible and affordable, options to eating self-conscious animals (say pigs), one should take the alternative, as a self-conscious animal can take a conscious interest in its life, something humans can relate to and value perhaps more than anything. However, if there is no alternative, and the human needs to eat, is it ethically permissible to kill the self-conscious animal for food, as painless as possible?

Also, is it not these human specific traits that come up in conversation, such as moral agency, a high level of rationality, and the very ability to entertain these traits in conversation, that allow us to single out our species in relation to any other? Does this warrent some partiality? Thoughts of superiority? How is superiority determined? And can say the superiority of the cheetah with its ability to run faster than humans be outweighed by the humans superiority to be or have any of the traits noted above?

patriotism

As far as uncovering the ethics of patriotic partiality, the example of one's mother or family as analogous to one's country does not hold up. Of course one feels obligated to whom they are emotionally attached to (through sentimentality or otherwise) ,as with the example of one's mother and a stranger trapped in a burning building, and only one can be rescued, an attempt will be made to rescue one's mother over the stanger. But is this really an ethical problem? Though if a stranger is in a fire, one does not simply let them burn because they are not one's mother, and one does not throw a stranger into fire simply because it is not one's mother; it would be wrong to think or do either action, just as it would be to cause harm to another country or let another country suffer simply because it is not one's own country. There is rarely, if ever, an instance where one must choose between the two, when both may suffer. I think one's country can thrive without causing detriment to another country, and one can have patriotism solely on sentimentality, and without harmful partiality. However, if one's country were to perform a decidedly wrong action towards another (or even one's mother towards a stranger, see Plato's Euthyphro), it would seem to be ethical (and patriotic?) to call one's country out on their wrongdoing (and even feel ethical sentimentality towards the harmed country?), regardless of sentimentality. However, I am curious as to the legitimacy of the origins of this patriotic sentimentality, as the idea of a country as merely an abstraction is interesting. (Kateb) If this is true, the idea of country being analogous to a mother or family is even more unfounded. Is it possible that the idea of a country is merely an abstraction (an impersonal, invented concept, (Kateb))?

two-fold nature of experience

Beginning with the professor's recognition of developing ethics for meat consumption while appealing to 'this world empiricism' can allow for various grounded arguments to unfold, which can obviously complicate policy discussions, and continuing with the observances of the class' various thoughts and ideas on our topic of discussions, it became evident to me that even if we can find a common ground to begin our discussion, while appealing to 'this world empiricism', different viewpoints are sure to develop. This made me question whether we are all experiencing the same thing, if a different interpretation arises for every different individual experiencing. Although it appears more likely that, in a discussion, or any experience, what is experienced can be, but not always is, the same (i.e. entertaining the notion of eating meat), yet the experience itself differs from individual to individual. Therefore, what can be taken from any experience is (at least) two-fold. As what is experienced, the other, remains what it is. If it is understood that this remains the same, regardless of who is experiencing it, it can be known and discussed (?). However, as the experience itself of the other varies, is purely subjective, confusion can arise when attempting to find neutral ground. Is a system independent of experience, yet built on what is experienced, possible? And would this help alleviate the debate of naturalism and supernaturalism?

labels

These labels of 'this world', and 'supernatural', though likely necessary for discussion, also hinder the discussion somewhat (perhaps Heidegger would agree, I think). There only is the world and the natural. When some adhere to an explanation that is not empirically verifiable, why must the explanation be thought to be supernatural or other-worldly? I understand, for the sake of attempting to understand each other's ideas, assuming there is an objective reality, distinguishing between those who attribute the nature of something to humans or unconscious Nature, or to a conscious Nature (of course it would be easier to say naturalists or supernaturalists) is helpful. Also, what has become the predominant Christian/Western conception of God (and other non-material entities, etc.) cannot be the idea that dominates the discussion of what is being called 'supernatural'. The interplay (for lack of a better word at the moment) of consciousness, for example, is something we all experience, and yet our experiences vary, and many of these experiences cannot be verified empirically. Does this make consciousness supernatural? Why does it seem to me that many would incline that God as consciousness is a mysterious, yet natural idea, yet God is so often quickly considered supernatural? Perhaps the answer would be because consciousness is an external manifestation of the brain, and therefore, to consider consciousness as God would be foolish. However, this cannot be empirically proven, and even if consciousness did manifest from the brain, this is not to say that it is the only way for it to exist, however irrational this may seem. I am not saying I know where consciousness is or its origins, I am merely saying the question of consciousness (as an example), is open and will likely remain so when it comes to strictly empirical explanations of the various interplay of consciousness. Yet, is consciousness not natural?

I agree with Clark that their needs to be a neutral ground for varying points of view in the public domain, for there is no place in policy or curriculum for what he calls 'supernatural' discussion; whether it is constructed by humans, or intelligently designed into the blueprint of the universe for the sustainability of harmony, what is right and what is wrong, or what is a legitimate interest in the education and preservation of our species, can be agreed upon solely with empirical evidence; yet I also think the common conception of those who appeal to 'otherworldly' or 'supernatural' explanations needs to be revisited, for it is misunderstood, and legitimately has its place in certain inquiries.

I am still unclear as to what is 'supernatural', and why it must be considered so. If it is merely for discussion, it must be used with caution; otherwise some components of our experience will be neglected when they may be vital to our understanding.

this world

In response to those who think Clark is distinctly biased, the concept of "this world empiricism" seems to imply the possibility of another world to which some appeal to help explain events or ideas in this world. However, as noted in my last entry, every one, 'naturalists' and 'supernaturalists', experience what Clark refers to as 'this world'. As Jansen put eloquently, 'this world empiricism' is merely an attitude adopted for discussion, considering the context. Naturalists do not adhere to any 'supernatural' explanations, but 'this world empiricists' can, and those who do, put it aside for the 'this world' context, this is a distinct difference between naturalism and 'this world empiricism'.

supernatural or mysterious?

If experience determines one's reason to follow or form a religious or spiritual (I am not partial to the word supernatural) view of reality (or even a naturalist view), this experience can be the evidence needed to subscribe to a certain view, but the experience, especially in the instance of spiritual views, is either purely subjective or such that only a select few can relate to; and therefore, what place do spiritual views have in the public domain of policy making or institutional curriculums? Likely none. To put this another way, there is 'natural' experience and 'supernatural' experience; everyone experiences what is called 'natural' (experience that is objective, and has science/sensory based evidence), and therefore 'supernatural' discussion should likely be left out of the 'public space'. The idea of the 'supernatural', however, is an idea of the naturalists, as those that the naturalists refer to as supernaturalists consider their so-called supernatural beliefs to be natural.

Nature is mysterious, as the professor assured. What we experience cannot always be explained or understood clearly or entirely, but does that make these experiences 'supernatural'? What is the difference between mysterious and supernatural? Or the difference between an event that is mysterious and an event that can only be taken on faith? Should the mysteriousness of nature or the acknowledgement that we are prone to having experiences that science cannot entirely explain (even if the potential to eventually understand is there) be left out of the 'public space', if these events are very much apart of nature as we currently experience and attempt to understand it?

Two to Begin

As far as using the negative of a positive idea (or being) to know that idea... I agree this can be done, or be helpful, but only when there exists another positive idea. Though when any positive idea comes to exist, the negative of that idea simultaneously comes to exist, there must be at least two positive ideas to know anything about either idea, by experiencing one in relation to the other. An idea cannot be known solely through the absence of the idea.

Concerning Beauty, can beauty be experienced without appeal to senses? Can an idea or an emotional state be or bring upon beauty? Or would this be a misuse of the word beautiful?

'The way the world is' (?)

First, I would like to announce my discontent for relying on technology to unfold and display such inquiries, as this is the second time I've had to rip this from my thought to write up here, as words seem to mysteriously disappear more frequently on a computer than thoughts do from a mind. However, I remain committed to the blog.

Despite the possible obviousness of this claim, it appears that a reason the discussion of the 'Correspondend Theory of Truth' remains open ended and lingered in class is the ambiguity of 'the way the world is' to which a claim must correspond to be true. Aside from hallucinations and individually constructed perceptions of any objective or subjective plane, which can vary, be relative, and change in the context, must a claim, according to this theory, correspond to collectively constructed perceptions (which are of course necessary for us to associate, communicate and live in the experience of our consciousness), or to the 'thing-in-itself', the essence or concept to which to claim is referring? Consider the example that Professor Johnson gave, the claim "snow is white" is true if it corresponds with the experience of white snow. However, for one to have the complete truth of this claim, one must ask, "is snow, snow?" and "is white, white?" Does the collectively constructed perception of the substance of snow and the property of whiteness correspond with the 'thing-in-itself' or essence of snow and white? The so-called essence of such things does form and change to a degree with our perceptions, but beyond the perceptions, the original or true essence is difficult to grasp and communicate, and will we ever truly know if "snow is white"? Of course even if we did know the 'thing-in-itself' or broke down the other into its base properties, which we may know, but not typically perceive, such as sub-atomic particles or wavelengths of energy, this does not do us much good in the pursuit of practical knowledge (though this is different from truth). And therefore, as stated, we need to make definitions and give names to our collectively constructed perceptions of consciousness in order to associate, communicate and live in our experience.