Wednesday, February 24, 2010

patriotism

As far as uncovering the ethics of patriotic partiality, the example of one's mother or family as analogous to one's country does not hold up. Of course one feels obligated to whom they are emotionally attached to (through sentimentality or otherwise) ,as with the example of one's mother and a stranger trapped in a burning building, and only one can be rescued, an attempt will be made to rescue one's mother over the stanger. But is this really an ethical problem? Though if a stranger is in a fire, one does not simply let them burn because they are not one's mother, and one does not throw a stranger into fire simply because it is not one's mother; it would be wrong to think or do either action, just as it would be to cause harm to another country or let another country suffer simply because it is not one's own country. There is rarely, if ever, an instance where one must choose between the two, when both may suffer. I think one's country can thrive without causing detriment to another country, and one can have patriotism solely on sentimentality, and without harmful partiality. However, if one's country were to perform a decidedly wrong action towards another (or even one's mother towards a stranger, see Plato's Euthyphro), it would seem to be ethical (and patriotic?) to call one's country out on their wrongdoing (and even feel ethical sentimentality towards the harmed country?), regardless of sentimentality. However, I am curious as to the legitimacy of the origins of this patriotic sentimentality, as the idea of a country as merely an abstraction is interesting. (Kateb) If this is true, the idea of country being analogous to a mother or family is even more unfounded. Is it possible that the idea of a country is merely an abstraction (an impersonal, invented concept, (Kateb))?