Over-analyzing RC

I noted in class that I think we may be over-analyzing the Radical Constructivist positon by entertaining ontological notions about tangible, sensible objects such as apples, skies, spears, etc. in an attempt to understand RC. I suggested that we entertain such situations as pedagogical scenarios in an attempt to find some practical use and understanding of RC philosophy. For example, if Professor Johnson has a lesson plan for the class, it is of no concern whether he actually has one or what it is, to the RC, but that each subjective agent experiencing the lesson constructs knowledge claims throughout and about the lesson in a way that is viable for that subjective agent.

Also, whether an experience is direct, or indirect, such as in the situation of experiencing memory, what does it matter, as long as the experience or construct/claim is viable with one's experience?

Are some indirect experiences more viable than others? (assuming there are different kinds of indirect experience, remembering, meditating, etc.)

RC cont.

Even if RC's wish to leave ontological notions out of the picture, or continue with agnostic responses, it seems as though the practical application of thier epistemological position will not be entertained seriously by realists unless RC's concede an objectice reality through which our experiences unfold and to which our constructs are made. If this could be done (and seems to be done with conceding an inter-subjective reality), the notion that each experiencer constructs claims (at least to one's own mind) about that which is experienced, and only that construct can be known may be worth considering in certain scenarios. There seems to be many scenarios, however, in which one's idea of an experience is extremely compatible with another's idea of the experience, and it is interesting how nicely that works out if we all construct ideas for our knowledge of our experience to 'fit' our experience. This conception of knowledge 'fitting' our world would seem to imply that we all have similar ideas that will 'fit' our world, or desire the same world, if our ideas are compatible. Perhaps, on the surface they are compatible, and they must be for subjects in an inter-subjective reality to interact, but in reality, maybe even the compatible ideas are different from subject to subject, and below the surface are mere constructs of how each perceives each one's experience.

What does it mean to claim that knowledge 'fits' the world?